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Articles
Law and Labor in the New Global
Economy: Through the Lens of
United States Federalism
MARK BARENBERG*
The heightened economic globalization of the last quarter
century presents a welter of new questions for legal scholars,
policymakers, and practitioners. In many specialized fields, lawyers
and academics are reskilling in comparative and international law in
response to the growing importance of the transnational linkages and
competition facing economic and regulatory actors in the United
States. Concurrently, dramatic economic and political "transitions"
in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe have created legal
uncertainties and innovations that compound the challenges of
transnationalization. Issues of labor and employment law are at the
center of both of these epochal transformations-globalization and
regime-transition. The articles in this symposium reflect well the
range and urgency of these issues.
Economic Globalization. Two broad aspects of economic
globalization are particularly relevant to labor lawyers. The first is
the growing international integration of product, capital, and labor
markets.' Transnational flows of labor have again become a
flashpoint of electoral politics in the United States and elsewhere.
The controversy has spilled into the legislative arena in proposals to
limit immigrant workers' access to jobs and government benefits?
It has also renewed perennial debates over the stringency and enforce-
ment of domestic immigration law and minimal labor conditions, such
as child labor, sweatshop, and wage and hour rules.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. See, e.g., PE=ER DIcKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: THE INTERNATIONALiZATON OF
ECONOMIC AcTIVITY 3-5 (2d ed. 1992).
2. See, e.g., the pending Welfare Reform Act of 1995 which was passed by the House
of Representatives on March 24, 1995. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995).
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It is true that the volume of transnational labor migration
remains small compared to international flows of products and
capital.3 But the integration of world product and financial markets
itself generates de facto integration of world labor markets.4 For
example, the threatened or actual movement of light-assembly
operations from the United States to developing economies effectively
places low-skilled United States workers in competition with poorly
paid workers abroad. Imports of manufactured goods from emerging
economies have a similar practical consequence. That is, cross-border
movements of capital and products entail transnational labor competi-
tion even in the absence of direct labor mobility. Such labor
competition both affects and is affected by the domestic and interna-
tional labor laws enforced in each country.
The second relevant aspect of globalization is the spread of new
types of workplace and corporate organization. There are lively
debates among political economists about whether strategic, financial
decisionmaking power within multinational corporations is growing
more or less concentrated.' There is, however, a broadening
consensus that the production process is increasingly embodied in
decentralized, flexible units that form networks within and across
corporate boundaries. This organizational trend challenges the
viability of labor-law and social-insurance regimes rooted historically
in bureaucratic mass-production enterprises, whether in capitalist or
collectivist polities.7 It also poses intricate, novel problems for
lawyers (representing governments, investors, or workers) who
negotiate foreign investment deals or employment contracts, collective
or individual, that seek to exploit the advantages of flexible work sys-
tems. In their contribution to this Symposium, Professors Woo and
Williams compare the responses of the social insurance regimes of
the United States and China to the growth of insecurity and segmen-
3. DAVID E. BLOOM & ADI BRENDER, LABOR AND THE EMERGING WORLD ECONOMY
22 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4266, 1993).
4. Id. at 10-16.
5. BENNETT HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE
POWER IN THE AGE OF FLEXIBILITY 3-12, 171 (1994).
6. E.g., Charles Sabel, Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open Labor Markets: Some
Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in a Volatile Economy, in
SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 23, 23-46 (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman
eds., 1991).
7. See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, passim
(1994).
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tation in two very different national labor markets.8 Mao-chang Li's
contribution to this Symposium illustrates the specific transactional
problems facing practicing lawyers in the context of China's
transition from a system of lifetime employment security in state
enterprises to a flexible, contract-based labor market.9
Regime Transitions. The recent developments in political
regimes that are particularly relevant to labor law also fall into two
broad categories. First, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a surge
in international trade agreements-bilateral, regional, and global.
There are now more than thirty multilateral, regional trading blocs in
the world economy.10 The potential impact of these agreements on
labor conditions burst into popular consciousness in the United States
during debates over the ratification of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). European legal culture has longer-standing
familiarity with the issue of transnational labor standards, reflected in
the Social Protocol of the European Union (EU)." Last year, the
Clinton Administration proposed the inclusion of international labor
standards in United States legislation implementing the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
Second, the global wave of political reforms--capsulized in the
concept of "transitions to market and democracy"--has necessarily
shaken old regimes of labor and employment law.'3  Political
contests continue over the privatization of state enterprises, the
introduction of new forms of corporate governance, the deregulation
of labor markets; the structure and autonomy of labor unions, and the
provision of social insurance to dislocated workers. So long as these
8. Lucy Williams & Margaret Woo, The "Worthy" Unemployed: Societal Stratification
and Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 457 (1995).
9. Mao-Chang Li, Legal Aspects of Labor Relations in China: Critical Issues for
International Investors, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 521 (1995).
10. Vincent Cable, Overview, in TRADE BLOCS? THE FuTURE OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION 1, 1 (Vincent Cable & David Henderson eds., 1994).
11. For a summary of European initiatives under the Social Protocol, see John T.
Addison & W. Stanley Siebert, Recent Developments in Social Policy in the New European
Unions, 48 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 5 (1994).
12. On the vicissitudes of proposals for inclusion of labor standards in the GATT
regime, see Gary Yerkey, U.S. Failing to Convince Other Countries to Use Sanctions to
Enforce Labor Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 28, 1995).
13. See, e.g., LABOR MARKETS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE: THE TRANSITION AND BEYOND (Nicholas Barr ed. 1994); see also Frederic C.
Deyo, State and Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 182, 182-202 (Frederic C. Deyo
ed. 1987).
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and other basic elements of economic restructuring are unsettled, the
future path of labor laws remains open to political conflict and
imaginative policy making. For the same reason, the current practice
of labor law occurs on a treacherous terrain of uncertain rules,
administrative discretion, and disjunctures between laws on the book
and the law in action. These developments are illustrated in Profes-
sors Vause and Judge de Holanda Palhano's account of Brazilian
labor law and in Professor Josephs's discussion of the new labor laws
in China.1
4
"Social Dumping" and Multistate Labor Standards. From this
maelstrom of rapid change in the global political economy, the
concept of "social dumping" has emerged as a focus of debates about
desirable regimes of comparative and international labor law. 5 The
concept itself is straightforward, although its empirical importance
and its implications for legal reform are hotly contested. Social
dumping refers to the actual or threatened movement of capital from
high-wage economies to low-wage economies. Such cross-border
mobility of capital, it is argued, diminishes labor's distributive share
of enterprise returns, worsens workplace conditions, and induces a
"race to the bottom" among governments forced to compete for
capital by weakening legal protections for labor.
Two of the most important empirical questions about social
dumping remain unresolved. First, how significant are labor costs in
fact as a determinant of overall capital-location decisions? Highly
visible examples of cross-border movements of labor-intensive
production (e.g., in garments, footwear, and other manufactured-goods
assembly) suggest that social dumping is very real. 6 There is,
nonetheless, substantial evidence that, in many sectors of advanced
economies, the advantages of "network" or "agglomeration" exter-
nalities among firms, and the presence of value-adding human and
physical infrastructure, outweigh the disadvantages of higher labor
14. W. Gary Vause & Dulcina de Holanda Palhano, Labor Law in Brazil-Statism and
Classical Liberalism Compared, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 583 (1995); Hilary K.
Josephs, Labor Law in a "Socialist Market Economy". The Case of China, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 559 (1995).
15. E.g., Christopher Erickson & Sarosh Kuruvilla, Labor Costs and the Social
Dumping Debate in the European Union, 48 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 28, 29-32 (1994).
16. E.g., WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, THE LOW-WAGE CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL GROWTH,
passim (1990).
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costs." Second, when capital does move to lower-wage economies,
do wage shares rise in tandem with productivity in the receiving
country? 8 An answer to this unsettled empirical question may be
relevant to the following difficult normative question: Do even minor
welfare gains among wage-earners in poor countries justify the
greater inequality, diminished employment opportunities, and
worsened working conditions that (by hypothesis) befall wealthier
countries that experience capital outflow?'9
Assuming social dumping is adjudged a significant practical and
normative problem, the actual impact of legal interventions designed
to counter the problem is similarly contested. The most widely
proposed intervention-mandating the "upward harmonization" of
transnational labor standards, as a means of preempting the race to
the bottom-has some familiar potential drawbacks. Employers or
governments in poorer countries may respond to specific labor
mandates (e.g., wages and hours) by lowering other specific standards
(e.g., worker safety and health) in order to avoid overall increases in
unit labor costs. 20 Even if a multistate regime were to harmonize all
labor conditions, governments or employers may attempt to maintain
low overall production costs by implementing subsidies or lower
standards in non-labor fields of regulation, such as environmental law.
Further, to the extent that mandated labor standards do succeed
in raising labor costs in poorer countries, capital inflows and whatever
welfare gains accrue therefrom (including jobs, technology transfers,
and development of indigenous managerial skill) may diminish.21
Many developing countries oppose legally mandated upward harmoni-
zation of labor standards on these or similar grounds.2 2  The rela-
17. See, e.g., HARRISON, supra note 5, at 225-27; Erickson & Kuruvulla, supra note 15,
at 45; C. KEITH HEAD, ET. AL., THE ATTRACTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS: INVESTMENT
PROMOTION AND AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES, 26 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 4878, 1994).
18. See MEAD, supra note 16, passim; BLOOM & BRENDER, supra note 3, at 20.
19. The gains to consumers from lower-priced products, as well as a plethora of
unpredictable social and economic effects on third parties in sending and receiving countries,
should also be counted in the calculus of overall well-being.
20. This is the standard "argument from futility" advanced by legal economists. For
competing views on the strength of this argument, compare RONALD G. EHRENBERG, LABOR
MARKETS AND INTEGRATING NATIONAL ECONOMIES 6-7 (1994) with MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 176-85 (1987).
21. John T. Addison & W. Stanley Siebert, The Social Charter of the European
Community: Evolution and Controversies, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 597, 618 (1991).
22. These arguments may be self-interested rationalizations when advanced by state and
business elites who benefit from the taxes and profits accrued through low-wage development
strategies.
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tively weak standards and enforcement mechanisms in the labor side
agreement of NAFTA--described in Joaquin Otero's contribution to
this Symposium-reflect these interests in part.23 The same inter-
ests, compounded by the self-interest of multinational investors,
propel political resistance to the kind of multinational codes of
conduct discussed by Lance Compa and Tashia Hinchliffe-Darri-
carr~re in this Symposium.
2 4
Another legal policy to prevent social dumping is the large-scale
transfer of public funds from high-wage to low-wage countries. The
goal, of course, is to encourage rapid economic development in
poorer countries in order to diminish the very wage gap that creates
the incentive for social dumping. (The various structural funds of the
European Union embody this policy.") Although such transfers,
ironically, are simply a different form of capital flow (public rather
than private), the difference may have important implications. Unlike
competition in the market for private capital, countries and employers
need not compete for public capital by means of a race to the bottom
in labor standards. In addition, systems of progressive taxation in the
richer, sending country may be a pre-existing political mechanism for
raising such public funds, by contrast with the politically difficult
implementation of new "trade adjustment" programs targeted to
compensate workers hurt by private capital outflows.2 6 Nonetheless,
as a practical political matter, implementation of the basic policy of
large-scale, international transfers of public resources is itself less
likely than mandated labor standards, at a time when wealthier
countries are gripped by the politics of secular productivity slow-
downs and large budget deficits.
Transnational harmonization of labor standards thus remains very
much at the forefront of reform efforts in international and compara-
tive labor law. Indeed, as discussed presently, quite similar problems
of harmonization face large domestic legal systems, such as China's,
which seek to avoid excessive inequalities among provinces and
localities when markets replace central governments in the allocation
of labor and capital.2
23. Joaquin Otero, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: An
Assesment of Its First Year's Implementation, 33 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 637 (1995).
24. Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarr6re, Enforcing International Labor
Rights through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 663 (1995).
25. See generally Addison & Siebert, supra note 21, at 619-623 (discussing the
European Social Charter).
26. See, e.g., EHRENBERG, supra note 20, at 2.
27. See CHINA DECONSTRUCTS (David Goodman and Gerald Segal eds., 1994).
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Harmonized Labor Standards in Multistate Systems: Some
Familiar Legal Models from United States Federalism. There are
already a variety of emerging or proposed forms of transnational legal
harmonization of labor standards. Multilateral instruments, some of
which are mentioned above, include the NAFTA side agreements, the
Social Protocol of the EU, various non-binding covenants of the
International Labor Organization (ILO),28 and proposals to add labor
standards to the GATT. Unilaterally imposed standards are contained
in various United States statutes that condition trade and investment
benefits on the maintenance of minimum labor conditions in countries
producing for export to the United States and in countries receiving
United States foreign investment. These include the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP)29 and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI),30 which afford tariff preferences to certain developing
countries' exports; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC),31 which provides guarantees and other assistance to United
States investors in developing countries; Section 301 of the United
States Trade Act of 1974 (as amended),32 which authorizes certain
punitive action against trading partners; and legislative proposals to
impose codes of conduct on United States-based multinational
corporations.33
Although these fledgling transnational initiatives deserve close
examination, the most fully developed models of labor standards
within multistate systems are the longstanding regimes of domestic
labor law within federally structured nation-states. The United States'
multistate regime contains at least six legal-harmonization models that
are useful exemplars (good or bad) both for transnational regimes and
for domestic federal systems currently undergoing restructuring. The
first and most obvious is the model of national or multistate uniformi-
ty, exemplified by United States legislation on collective bargaining
and on pensions.34 This legislation preempts all state regulation that
is either more or less stringent than federal standards. The domestic
28. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, SUMMARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
STANDARDS (1988).
29. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1994).
30. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (1994).
31. Authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2191a (1994).
32. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1992).
33. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarr6re, supra note 24.
34. E.g., Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Com'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (preemption of state collective bargaining law by
National Labor Relations Act); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(preemption of state pension law by federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
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model of national uniformity is analogous to the most blunt form of
transnational harmonization, namely, specific mandated standards that
are binding on all nation-state parties to a multilateral agreement.35
The second model in United States federalism imposes nation-
wide minimum standards, but allows the several states to provide
greater labor protection. This model prevails in the areas of mini-
mum wages and maximum hours,36 health and safety,37 and anti-
discrimination law.38 A third model--programs which offer federal
financial incentives for heightened state standards in order to preempt
the race to the bottom among states-is best illustrated by the• 31
unemployment compensation system. In fields in which the states
have successfully avoided the race to the bottom, a fourth model has
prevailed: state regulatory primacy, that is, complete non-intervention
by the federal government. It is no coincidence that this model
applies to programs, such as workers' compensation, which afford
benefits to employers as well as workers.4 Such mutual benefits
may diminish the threat of capital mobility across states and therefore
lessen the likelihood of federal intervention to solve the collective
action problem created by state competition for mobile capital.
The fifth model is characterized by explicit cooperative initia-
tives among groups of states, such as regional economic development
programs. In effect, these programs upwardly harmonize labor
market conditions by means of states' horizontal agreement (rather
than the federal government's vertical mandate) to preempt competi-
tive deregulation among potentially competing states. A final model
is individual states' unilateral "tit for tat" penalties (in the form of
taxes or import restraints) against sister states whose lax labor
standards threaten to induce a downward regulatory spiral among the
several states. Although such unilateral penalties are a staple of
United States transnational policies,4 the United States constitution
35. Examples include various health and safety, antidiscrimination, and child labor
standards under the EU's Social Protocol. Note that the NAFrA side agreement does not
include such specific substantive standards, but instead calls only for the enforcement of non-
harmonized domestic labor laws of the NAFTA members.
36. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1988).
37. See Occupational Safety and Health Act § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
38. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 708, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
39. See Federal Unemployment Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1105
(1988).
40. See PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, DID WORKERS PAY FOR THE
PASSAGE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS? 2-4 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 4947, 1994).
41. See supra note 32.
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generally'withholds such weaponry from the domestic states. The
Supreme Court has so interpreted the Commerce Clause's implicit
prohibition of excessive state interference with interstate commerce,
even when a state's unilateral penalties are designed to serve the
larger constitutional goal of sustaining a harmonized national
market.42
Historical Patterns of Labor Conditions Generated By United
States Federalism. How have the idiosyncracies of United States
labor law affected the multistate pattern of actual labor conditions?
In the twentieth century, the United States has witnessed both
substantial variation in labor standards among its several states, and
great ease of capital mobility to low-wage, relatively non-unionized
states. First, the historical combination of the six models of labor
federalism discussed above has afforded individual states much room
for regulatory balkanization. By way of example, during the most
recent recession, the percentage of unemployed workers who actually
received unemployment benefits ranged from a low of 18 percent in
Virginia to a high of 63 percent in Rhode Island.43 The amount of
compensation also varies widely across states. Maximum weekly
unemployment benefits range from $154 in Nebraska to $468 in
Massachusetts. Welfare benefits for indigent children offer another
important example of the variability of social protection across states.
(Such welfare protection is a component of the so-called "social
wage." It significantly affects the bargaining power and labor
standards of unskilled workers, because it comprises part of the
default income when workers hold out during wage negotiations or
when employers threaten retaliatory dismissals against union support-
ers.) The average monthly benefit for a family of three ranges from
$120 in Mississippi to $950 in Alaska.44
Second, even in fields covered by the model of federal uniformi-
ty, the substance of federal law has not effectively prevented the
modes of capital mobility that generate downward spirals in labor
42. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 468 U.S. 269 (1988). Apart from the six
models of harmonized labor standards, United States law also implements many programs
that reflect, intentionally or not, the second broad response to social dumping discussed
above - that is, the redistribution of public resources among states of varying wealth. Two
examples include the linkage of unemployment compensation funds to state levels of
unemployment, and various programs that target federal benefits to workers displaced by
certain designated international trade policies.
43. MARC BALDWIN & RICHARD MCHUGH, UNPREPARED FOR RECESSION: THE
EROSION OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOSTERED BY PUBLIC POLICY IN THE 1980S
3 (Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper, Feb. 1992).
44. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1994 GREENBOOK, passim (1994).
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conditions. The federal law of collective bargaining preempts state
law, but many specific rules permit capital to escape unionized
sectors and regions of the economy. Two rules are especially
important in this regard. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
does not allow workers to create multi-employer units of bargaining
without the consent of all affected employers.'a This rule impedes
unions from achieving their fundamental goal of "taking labor
standards out of market competition." That is, non-unionized
employers may out-compete higher-cost unionized employers and
therefore erode the unionized sector. Even among unionized
employers, the opportunity for separate wage settlements puts
pressure on different units of workers to compete for jobs through
concessions in labor standards. The NLRA also allows a unionized
employer to relocate to a non-union facility if the employer justifies
the decision on economic grounds and shows no emotional hostility
to unionism per se.4 6
Third, after World War I, the formal sovereign supremacy of
the national government was overshadowed by the substance of
federalist party politics, which helped preserve balkanized labor
market standards across the several states. The dominant New Deal
coalition within the Democratic Party included strange bedfellows:
the pro-labor, urban liberals of the Northeastern and Midwestern
states, and the anti-union, white supremacist political machines
controlled by Southern state elites.a7 The latter blocked the kind of
aggressive implementation of high federal labor standards that would
have threatened Southern low-wage economic strategies. Southern
elites, of course, also vetoed civil rights policies that may have eased
the unionization of the racially divided Southern labor force. Thus,
the nation remained divided between high and low labor-standard
states. The long-term movement of capital from the unionized North
to the nonunion South after the 1930s 8 can thus be understood as
a classic instance of social dumping within a multistate regime.
Lessons For Transnational Labor Law from United States
Federalism. The United States experience shows that the construction
of centralized decisionmaking structures, even if vested with supreme
45. ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 87 (1976).
46. NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955).
47. RiCHARD BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: 1880-
1980, passim (1984).
48. See MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: POLITICS AND ECONOMY
IN THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. WORKING CLASS 137 (1986).
[33:445
LAW AND LABOR IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY
sovereign authority over labor standards, is insufficient to avoid social
dumping within multistate systems. The substantive legal standards
implemented by federal authorities may permit social dumping in the
form of movements of capital either across the borders of geographic,
public institutions (federal states) or across the boundaries of
functional, private institutions (labor federations).49 Whether the
central legal system has the will and capacity to impose upwardly
harmonized labor standards depends on many historical contingencies.
The example of United States federalism illustrates that local political
mobilization and contestation is likely to be one crucial historical
variable. The eventual breakup of Southern political machines-
under the hammer of the civil rights movement and a variety of new
economic pressures-came too slowly and too late to produce
effective, high labor standards with nationwide scope. The recent de-
unionization and rapid increase in inequality of incomes within the
United States workforce-unmatched in any other advanced industrial
economy"L-are the twin progeny of the domestic, multistate politics
of social dumping.
49. Of course, such "private," federally structured institutions are themselves creatures
of public law. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power,
Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1424 n.209 (1993).
50. E.g., Richard Freeman & Lawrence Katz, Rising Wage Inequality: The United States
Vs. Other Advanced Countries, in WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULEs 29, 29-56 (Richard
Freeman ed., 1994).
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